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I construct a theory of foreign interventions in which the preferences of the foreign country 
over alternative local groups are determined by each group's international economic ties. In 
equilibrium, the foreign country supports the group with which it has the strongest ties, since 
this is most influenceable from the outside. However this is counterweighted by the tendency 
of the domestic political system to favour the least influenceable group. I allow for a non-
economic dimension of policy (geopolitics), and study how the saliency of this dimension 
may play in favor of the incumbent group. My results help interpret the economic rationale 
for many Western interventions in developing countries in the 20
th century, and the role of 
economic nationalism in motivating the struggle for regime change. Furthermore, they help 
explain why the Cold War strengthened the West's preference for specific local groups. I 
provide detailed historical evidence in favor of my arguments. 
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In the last two decades, the political economy literature has put renewed eort in studying the
economics of political regime change. For example, an inuential body of work has studied the
transition to democracy in the 19th and 20th century (e.g. Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2006), while other work has focused on the determinants of regime change within
the context of non-democratic polities (e.g. Padro-i-Miquel, 2007). While all of these papers
see regime change as a possible outcome of the strategic interaction of domestic political groups,
almost none of them recognizes a role for foreign players in such an interaction.1
There is, however, considerable historical evidence that regime change is aected by (and of
consequence for) foreign players as well. For example, many changes in political regime were
facilitated or hindered by Western governments in the 20th century (e.g. Iran, 1953; Guatemala,
1954; Chile, 1973; etc.), and quite a few regime changes led to a drastic change in the external
relations of the aected country (e.g. Cuba, 1959; Iran, 1979). There are two recurrent ele-
ments to these and other examples. First, foreign interventions were underpinned by specic
preferences of the intervening government over alternative local groups. These preferences were
associated with dierent policy proles of alternative groups, most notably for what concerns
the treatment of foreign investors and the country's geopolitical alignment. Geopolitics played a
particularly important role during the Cold War, when even small countries had a high strategic
importance to the two superpowers.2 Second, although primarily motivated by the desire of do-
mestic redistributive reforms, the groups that pushed for regime change were also motivated by
a strong \nationalistic", or \anti-imperialist"ideology. This reected the perception that, under
the status quo, the terms conceded to foreign investors were too generous, and reected a sort
of informal political subjugation to foreign countries.
In this paper, I construct an economic theory of regime change that brings these international
factors to the forefront. I consider a two-country world where a foreign country (F) has economic
1An exception to this is Aidt and Albornoz (2011), which I discuss in detail below.
2Although Western governments often claim that they only support democratically elected governments, their
actions have often been motivated primarily by economic and geopolitical considerations. For example, recent
empirical evidence suggests that covert CIA interventions were mostly detrimental to democracy during the Cold
War (see Easterly et Al., 2008; and Dube et Al., 2011)
2power vis- a-vis the home country (H), in the sense that a disruption in bilateral economic
relations has a higher cost for F than for H. I assume that F can use this power to extract rents
from H, and to secure its alignment in an ongoing geopolitical contest. There are two dierent
types of geopolitical contests, \confrontational" (when H's alignment is benecial to F, but costly
to H) and \Cold War" (when H's alignment is benecial to F, but does not aect H's welfare
directly). There are two groups in H, an incumbent and a challenger. These have the same
geopolitical preferences, however they may bear a dierent economic burden from disruption
in bilateral relations with F. The challenger can overthrow the incumbent at a stochastically-
determined cost, but the incumbent can block this by investing in repression. Finally, there is a
foreign intervention technology, that F can use to hinder (or facilitate) regime change. I consider
two negotiations regimes, one in which pre-existing foreign rents can be renegotiated eciently
after a regime change, and one in which they can only be renegotiated down at the cost of a
deterioration in bilateral economic relations (possibly because of reputation concerns for F).
My main results are as follows. Not surprisingly, F intervenes in favor of the group (be it the
incumbent or the challenger) with which it has the strongest economic ties. This is because this
group is a weaker negotiating partner, and therefore provides a stronger guarantee of future rents
and geopolitical alignment. However the eect of foreign intervention is counterweighted by a
\stronger government eect", whereby H's political system tends to favor in power the group
with a stronger bargaining position vis- a-vis F. When pre-existing rents can be renegotiated
eciently, these are the only two eects through which international factors aect domestic
regime change. Thus, homogeneous geopolitical preferences are sucient to rule out any role of
geopolitics in this case.
When pre-existing rents cannot be renegotiated eciently, however, the incumbent group
may have an advantage at securing foreign support. This is because this group may be able
to unilaterally concede rents to the foreign country, so as to create an expectation of inecient
renegotiation after regime change. When this is the case, regime change is also hindered by an
\inecient renegotiation eect", which internalizes the cost of regime change stemming from a
deterioration in H's external relations. In this case, foreign interventions may be driven by Cold
War (but not confrontational) geopolitical concerns: intuitively, this is because economic fric-
3tions between H and F expand to contaminate geopolitical relations between the two countries.
Thus, economic dierences between the two groups may be sucient to dierentiate their geopo-
litical prole from F's perspective, despite the assumption of ex-ante homogenous geopolitical
preferences.
The results of the model are consistent with (and may help interpret) a few recent empirical
ndings in international political economy (see below and section 2.3). More specically, they
provide an economic interpretation of the pattern of Western interventions in some developing
countries during the 20th century, and of the emergence of economic nationalism as a key ideolog-
ical factor in the domestic struggle for regime change. The model may also help understand the
role of the Cold War in sharpening the West's preference for specic local groups. An economic
explanation of this preference seems particularly needed, since not always this is easy to explain
with intrinsic ideological dierences between alternative local groups. I develop my argument by
looking at historical evidence from a \classical"chapter in the history of 20th century Western
interventions, namely US interventions in Latin America.
The paper contributes to the political economy literature on regime change. Much of this
has focused on democratization, and can be organized into two main strands. The rst focuses
on redistribution as a driver for democratization (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), while
the second postulates that it is economically protable for the ruling group to share power with
a broader sets of citizens, (e.g. Lizzeri and Persico, 2004).3 I borrow the basic structure of
the model from papers in the rst group, but innovate on these by specically looking at the
case of foreign interventions. To the best of my knowledge, the only paper to have done this
before is Aidt and Albornoz (2011), who adapt the Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) model to
account for foreign interventions. As in this paper, I assume that a group's economic prole
naturally makes it more or less benevolent towards foreign companies and investors. However
my paper diers from Aidt and Albornoz (2011) in two main respects. First, in my model
a group's attitude towards foreign businesses is shaped by negotiations between governments
rather than between private agents. This allows me to consider the role of national economic
3For a detailed discussion of the literature on democratization, the interested reader is referred to Acemoglu
and Robinson (2006). A very concise review of the literature using formal modeling can instead be found in
Ticchi and Vindigni (2008).
4power in shaping overseas economic and political expansion. Second, while Aidt and Albornoz
(2011) only look at the economic rationale for foreign interventions (to protect national rents
in the intervened country), I relate foreign interventions to an additional dimension of policy,
namely geopolitical alignment. Because of these dierences, my paper oers a set of results that
are largely complementary to those by Aidt and Albornoz (2011).
The paper is also related to two recent strands of literature in international political economy.
The rst is an empirical literature that studies the determinants and consequences of Cold War
CIA and KGB interventions. Three papers in particular are relevant to my work. Easterly,
Satyanath, and Berger (2008) look at the impact of these interventions for democracy in the
intervened country, and nd this to be negative both in the short and in the long run. Dube,
Kaplan, and Naidu (2011) provide evidence of unusual stock trading in American companies that
would soon benet from classied CIA interventions, and argue that this is evidence in favor of
a close involvement of America's top corporate echelons in this country's foreign interventions.
Finally, Easterly et Al. (2010) nd that countries intervened by the CIA imports more from
US, a sign that US interventions gave the US a good degree of inuence over the intervened
country. My results are consistent with the ndings of these three papers, and, as I explain in
more detail below, may help to interpret some of them. The second strand of literature contains
a few theoretical papers studying the eciency implications of cross-border lobbying for domestic
trade policy formation (Endoh, 2005; Aidt and Hwang, 2008; Antras and Padro-i-Miquel, 2011).
I depart from this literature in various respects, but most notably because I consider the relation
between cross border lobbying and regime change.
The paper is organized as follows. I present the model in sections 2.1 and 2.2, and discuss
the main results in section 2.3. Section 3 contains the historical evidence on Latin America, rst
at the level of overview and then through detailed country studies. Section 4 concludes, and
discusses some possible extensions.
52 Model
I describe the structure of the model in section 2.1, and solve for the equilibrium in section 2.2.
The characteristics of the equilibrium are then summarized and discussed in section 2.3.
2.1 Model description
2.1.1 Balance of power, foreign rents, and geopolitics
There are two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F). When the two countries cooperate eco-
nomically, H's national income is worth Y , while F's national income is worth 1 (this is just a
normalization). However if bilateral economic cooperation breaks down, H's income falls by gY ,
while F's income falls by gY , with  < 1 and small enough. The two governments negotiate
over bilateral cooperation, and this always breaks down in the absence of an agreement. The
simplest way to think about this is that H and F are negotiating over a mutual reduction in
import taris, where it is jointly optimal to eliminate taris but individually optimal to keep
them in place. The fact that H suers more from a breakdown in economic cooperation would
then capture the fact that F's elasticity of import demand is higher than H's, possibly because
F is more important a market for H's products than H is for F's products.
I assume that, when they are rst undertaken, negotiations are always ecient, that is they
lead to an agreement on bilateral economic cooperation. There exist two policy tools through
which the surplus created by an agreement can be transferred. First, there is a non-distortionary
net transfer rY from H to F. This transfer - which can be negative - can be the sum of
positive and negative items. One useful way to interpret the former is \rents" granted to F's
companies in H's economy,4 while the latter may be interpreted as foreign aid paid by F to
H. For concreteness, I will refer to the net transfer as \rent" in what follows. Second, there is
a geopolitical decision  that H must make. This consists in deciding whether H is \aligned"
( = 1) or not ( = 0) with F in an ongoing geopolitical contest. H's alignment always increases
4For example, F's direct investors may be granted favorable terms in the exploitation of local natural resources,
or in the provision of local utilities services. Alternatively, F's exporters may be accorded a preferential access to
public expenditure contracts. The importance of this last channel has been demonstrated empirically by Easterly
et Al. (2010).
6F's payo by sY , where s will be referred to as the \strategic value" of H. On the contrary,
it decreases H's own payo by  sY , and the parameter  2 f0;1g captures the nature of the
geopolitical contest.
There are two dierent types of geopolitical contest. In a \confrontational" contest, H and
F are pitched one against the other in the pursuit of a mutually exclusive geopolitical goal.
Examples may include the acquisition of a strategically important territory, or the building-up
of H's military capacity to the detriment of F's inuence over the surrounding region. Within a
confrontational contest, H's alignment essentially means that this country surrenders its geopo-
litical ambitions to F. I thus model this type of contest by setting  = 1. In a \Cold War"
contest, F is involved in a larger geopolitical contest against a third country (or coalition of
countries), whose outcome does not aect H's payos directly. H's alignment here means that
H undertakes supporting activities for F (as opposed to its opponent) that increase F's chances
of victory. Examples may include the alignment of voting pattern in the UN, the authorization
for F to use the national territory as a military stronghold, or the guarantee of a continued
supply of raw materials in the case of war. Since alignment does not have an immediate cost to
H in this case, I model it by setting  = 0.5
Anticipating elements that will be introduced in the next section, I allow for the possibility
that alternative groups may be in power in H at the moment of engaging in negotiations with
F. While all citizens of H are identical in terms of geopolitical preferences, dierent groups may
dier in the cost they bear from a breakdown in bilateral economic cooperation. In other words,
dierent groups in H may have dierent economic ties with F. The outcome of negotiations
between the two countries will then also depend on the cost from a breakdown for the specic
group that is negotiating for H.
Denoting the incumbent group by i and its aggregate loss from a breakdown in cooperation
by gi, the optimal value of r and  that comes out of a Nash bargaining between the two parties
5In this model, F but not its \Cold War" opponent is active in attracting H to its side. While it would be
a natural extension to include a third country, I choose not to do this in the interest of simplicity. The case I
am describing should then be thought of as one in which F's capacity to intervene in H (see below) is militarily
more developed than its opponent's. Alternatively, F's superior inuence may be grounded in the strength of its
economic links with the economy of H (see the conclusions for some further discussion of this point). In a sense,
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Clearly, when  = 0, i = 1 is a necessary negotiation outcome. Intuitively, H's geopolitical
alignment increases the joint payo of the two countries, and must therefore be part of a joint
welfare-maximizing agreement. When  = 1, on the contrary, the maximization in (1) only
delivers the optimal total transfer T i  ri + i from H to F, without specifying how this is split
between ri and i. I solve this indecision by assuming that, whenever negotiations are ecient,










I have discussed so far the structure of initial negotiations between H and F. However it
seems plausible that, once r and  have been set, any renegotiation (e.g. due to a change in
government in H) may follow dierent rules than the initial negotiations. In particular, I want
to allow for the possibility that a downward renegotiation of r or  is problematic to F, possibly
because it risks to damage its reputation elsewhere.7 I capture this possibility by considering
two, starkly opposite, renegotiation regimes. In the rst regime, renegotiations follow exactly
the same procedure as initial negotiations. If group j replaces group i in power, then this will
lead to renegotiation along the lines of (1), after substituting gi with gj. In the second regime,
F cannot possibly accept a reduction in either r or . This implies that, whenever the new ruler
sets rj < ri or j < i, bilateral co-operation between the two countries must break down. While
renegotiation is always ecient in the rst regime, it may be inecient in the second regime.
With a slight abuse of terminology, I will call the rst regime the \ecient renegotiation" regime
6Such a power-based structure of negotiations for tari reduction may not apply for pairs of countries that are
both members of the WTO. This is because the \most favored nation" clause of the WTO prohibits members
from erecting discriminatory taris against one another. Notice however that, even for pairs of WTO members,
power-based negotiations may be relevant in the contest of regional trade agreements, which are not covered by
the most favored nation clause. More in general, power based negotiations may be relevant for forms of bilateral
economic co-operation that are not covered by the WTO, such as the provision of trade credit.
7What this is implicitly saying is that F cares more about its reputation in protecting existing rents than in
extracting new rents. This could be, for example, because existing rents are more readily observable by the public
than potential rents.
8(R = 1) and the second regime the \inecient renegotiation" regime (R = 0).
Notice that, if bilateral cooperation does break down and  = 1, it is always strictly optimal
for H's re-negotiators to set r = 0, and  = 0. If  = 0, however, the optimal choice of  after
the breakdown is indeterminate. I solve this indecision by assuming that all re-negotiators set
 = 0 in this case.8
2.1.2 Regime change and foreign interventions
Home is endowed with a mass 1 of atomistic citizens, and there are two group: an incumbent
(e) and a challenger (c). The incumbent has mass , while the challenger has mass 1   . The
incumbent, who is initially in power, owns a share  of national income. Some of this income
is generated through economic cooperation with F, and disappears if cooperation breaks down.
This portion of the incumbent's income represents a share  of the total cost to H from a
breakdown in cooperation. In other words, the incumbent has total income Y , of which gY
disappears if cooperation breaks down. It follows that the challenger has total income (1  )Y ,
of which (1   )gY disappears if cooperation breaks down. Of course, we require   g.
The challenger has the capacity to stage a revolution, which is always successful at over-
throwing the incumbent and bringing the challenger into power. This \regime change" has two
benets for the challenger. First, if allows the challenger to appropriate a share  2 (0;1) of
the incumbent's income. I take the tax  to be exogenously given, and to capture the degree
of appropriability of e's income. For simplicity, I assume this tax to be non distortionary, and
to apply uniformly to e's income. This implies that exactly  of the portion of e's income that
relies on cooperation with F gets redistributed to c, together with the rest. The second potential
benet from regime change is that there is a round of negotiations (or renegotiation) with F after
the leadership of H has been determined, and regime change gives c the chance to participate in
these negotiations in place of e.
The total cost of revolution is (+mF +m)Y . The term  is a stochastic term that captures
the expected cost of organizing an illegal action. As standard in the literature, I assume this
8One interpretation of this assumption is that F's opponent in the Cold War may oer to alleviate H's
economic hardship following to the breakdown of cooperation, in exchange for its geopolitical switch. Any such
deal would be optimal for negotiators in H, who don't have an intrinsic preference over .
9cost to be inuenced by stochastically determined factors (such as the existence of a leader, the
business cycle, etc.) that are uncorrelated with other variables in the model. The distribution
of  is taken to be uniform over the interval [ 1;M   1] (with M > 1), where the negative
portion of the support may capture additional stochastic benets from regime change (such as
the strength and diusion of ideas of redistributional justice). The parameter M will provide for
an inverse measure of the risk of revolution. Next, I allow for the possibility that F orchestrates
a direct intervention in H, to twist the probability of regime change to its advantage. This
intervention takes place immediately after  is revealed. Its eect is captured by the term mF,
which is positive if the intervention is against regime change or negative if it is in favor.9 Finally,
the term m  0 represents the incumbent's investment in repression activities.10 This is set
by e after observing all other factors that determine the cost of revolution ( and mF), and
immediately before the revolution decision by c. Notice that, by this choice of timing, I am
giving F a residual role in H's politics, in the sense that this country will only intervene when
it is absolutely necessary to twist regime change to its advantage.
I assume that, whenever the incumbent is unwilling to invest enough in repression to avoid
a revolution, it chooses to transfer power to the challenger rather then waiting for this group to
stage a revolution. This is a natural assumption, given that revolution will normally entail costs
to an incumbent that are on top of any cost from a change in policy. The main consequence of
this assumption is that revolution will never take place in this model.
Finally, I allow for the possibility that the incumbent unilaterally sets r and  before  is
revealed. This is to allow for the possibility that, in a world where renegotiation is inecient, the
incumbent may want to create an entrenched interest of F in the status quo, thus decreasing the
probability of regime change to its advantage. Because rents and alignment decisions are often
medium- to long-run in nature (think of the case of favorable concessions to F's investors, or the
concession of H's territory for the construction of military bases), it seems natural to assume
9Examples of interventions against regime change may include direct military interventions, the provision of
weapons or training to the incumbent's armed forces, or aid transfers in period of economic distress. Examples of
interventions in favor of regime change are the provision of military support to guerrilla ghters in the challenger
group, or the promise of diplomatic recognition following to regime change.
10This term may capture factors such as the intensity of police checks or the strength of the military (when
this is loyal to the existing regime), which are likely to increase the average expected cost of an illegal action.
10that they are preliminary set before observing the stochastic cost of revolution. I distinguish
initial from nal rents and alignment by denoting the former by r1 and 1, the latter by r2 and
2.
Summing up, the timing of the game is:
1. The incumbent (e) may unilaterally set foreign rents (r1Y and 1);
2. Nature picks the stochastic cost of revolution (Y ) for the challenger (c);
3. The foreign country (F) invests mFY in intervention; after observing this, e chooses
whether to invest mY in repression, or to transfer power to c.
4. If e has not transferred power, c may stage a successful revolution at a cost (+mF +m)Y .
5. If c is in power, it appropriates a share  of e's income. Whoever is in power negotiates
(or renegotiates) with F the nal level of rents (r2Y and 2). If R = 1, the outcome of the
negotiation does not depend on r1 and 1. If R = 0, F imposes sanctions whenever r2 < r1
or 2 < 1.
6. All payos realize.
In the next section, I solve for the equilibrium of the game using backward induction.
2.2 Backward induction
Since all variables are expressed as a share of H's total income, changes in this variable will not
aect the equilibrium. I then normalize all variables dividing them by Y .
Period 6
Denote by r2(j) and 2(j) the rents and alignment negotiated by group j in period 5. Also,
denote by  (j;R) an indicator function that is one if, under group j, economic cooperation be-
tween H and F has broken down in period 5, and zero otherwise. Notice that, since negotiations
are always ecient for R = 1, it is  (j;1) = 0 8j. Finally, denote by  an indicator function
that is one if revolution has taken place, zero otherwise.
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F(j) = r2(j) + 2(j)s    (j;R)g   jm
Fj (7)
where W i(j) denotes the aggregate payo to player i when group j is in power.
Period 5
Since the consequences of regime change for domestic redistribution are exogenously given,
all we need to focus on is the dierent outcome of negotiations depending on the group that is
in power. I begin by considering the case in which renegotiation is ecient (R = 1), and I will
then consider the case in which it is inecient (R = 0).
If R = 1, r2 and 2 are set according to (1), independently on r1 and 1. From our discussion
in section (2.1.1), we know that it must be (e) = (c) = 1. Thus, all that can dierentiate e


















We want to know under what conditions the incumbent concedes a higher rent to F than the







12Using the threshold 








Equation (11) says that the incumbent concedes a higher rent to F if and only if its economic
ties with F are suciently strong relative to those of c ( > 
). Intuitively, strong economic
ties make the incumbent very vulnerable to a breakdown in bilateral economic cooperation,
decreasing its negotiating power vis- a-vis F. The threshold 

is decreasing in , because the
more redistributive is regime change, the less the incumbent's initial ties with F are group-
specic. It is also increasing in , suggesting that a smaller group is more likely to concede a
higher rents to F. The dierence between the rents conceded by the two groups is larger, the
larger is the value of bilateral economic cooperation (g).11 On the contrary, although the nature
of the geopolitical conict () and the strategic importance of H (s) matter for the rent that F
may expect to receive from H, these variables do not aect the dierence in the rents conceded
by e and c. This is, of course, a consequence of our assumption that the two groups have identical
geopolitical preferences.
If R = 0, then r2 and 2 are set independently on r1 and 1 if r1  rj and 1  1, while
they do depend on r1 and 1 otherwise. Notice that, since it is always 1  1, all we need
to be concerned with is the size of r1, relative to rj. Intuitively, geopolitics per se can never
be a cause for the breaking up of economic cooperation, since parties have an alternative (and
preferred) tool to redistribute surplus between themselves. Clearly, if r1  ri, it must be again
[r2(j);2(j)] = (rj;1). If instead r1 > rj, the negotiating group must choose between setting
[r2(j);2(j)] = (r1;1)) and preserving the economic cooperation with F, or setting [r2(j);2(j)] =




  s  r
e (12)
11Comparing (8) and (9), it is immediately evident that re   rc is decreasing in .
13while the analogous condition for c is:
r1 <
[1   (1   )]g
1   
  s  r
c: (13)
Notice that it is always re > re and rc > rc. Furthermore, it is re > rc if and only if  > 
.
To summarize, we have identied three relevant ranges for r1, when group j is eventually in
power. If r1  rj, then it is [r2(j);2(j)] = (rj;1) as prescribed by (1). If r1 2 (rj;rj], it is
[r2(j);2(j)] = (r1;1). Finally, if r1 > rj, it is [r2(j);2(j)] = (0;0). Notice that a breakdown
in economic cooperation always contaminates geopolitical relations between H and F as well. I
here stress again that, while for  = 1 this a necessary outcome of i's optimization, for  = 0
it is the results of assumptions made. As explained in section 2.1.1, the logic underlying this
assumption is that a breakdown in bilateral cooperation destroys any economic leverage that F
has on H, precisely at a time in which H is in need of economic support. This will arguably make
it easy for F's geopolitical competitor to step in, particularly given H's geopolitical indierence.
Period 4
If e has transferred power in period 3, then nothing happens in this stage. If e has not
transferred power, on the contrary, c stages a revolution whenever the benet from doing so
is higher than the cost, given F's investment in foreign interventions and e's investment in
repression. Plugging  = 1 in (6) and setting this greater than (5) gives:
 <  + (1   )[r2(e)   r2(c)] + (1   )[2(e)   2(c)]s+




F   m: (14)
Period 3
Taking mF as given, e chooses to invest in repression if and only if this is not too costly,
relative to what the incumbent has to loose from regime change. The maximum investment in
14repression that e is willing to undertake is found by setting W e(e)   W e(c) > 0:
m <  +  [r2(c)   r2(e)] +  [2(c)   2(e)]s+
+ [ (c;R)    (e;R)]
g    (c;R)
g  m: (15)
When investing m is not enough to stop a revolution, e transfers power to c. Plugging m in
(14), we nd that this happens when:
 < r2(e)   r2(c) + [2(e)   2(c)]s+
+ [ (e;R)    (c;R)]g+
  m
F: (16)
Several observations can be made about condition (16). First, the probability of regime
change is aected by a \stronger-government eect". This is captured by the rst line on the
LHS of (16). The stronger-government eect attributes a political advantage to the group that
has the higher bargaining power vis- a-vis F. To see this, notice that if, for example, c has a
higher bargaining power than e, it is r2(c) < r2(e) and 2(c)  2(e). But condition (16) then
suggests that group c has a higher probability of going to power, relative to the case in which
it has a lower bargaining power than e (as it would then be r2(c) > r2(e) and 2(c)  2(e)).
Intuitively, regime change is welfare-increasing for the country as a whole, and this is recognized
by the domestic political system through a stronger incentive for c to rebel and a weaker incentive
for e to repress.
Next, regime change is also aected by a \bilateral disruption eect", as captured by the
second line in (16). This eect consists in the net gain (loss) to the country from any expected
change in bilateral economic relations due to the regime change. It attributes a political advan-
tage to the group that is less likely to provoke a breakdown in bilateral economic cooperation
with F. To stick to the previous example, if c's better negotiation outcomes come at the cost of
bilateral disruption, then the advantage than this group obtains from the stronger-government
15eect is decreased by the bilateral disruption eect (it is  (c;R)   (e;R) in condition 16).
Relative to before, the welfare gain from regime change is lower, and possibly negative. Notice
that the bilateral disruption eect can only exists if R = 0, because nal negotiations are always
ecient if R = 1.
Finally, I notice that the condition for regime change does not depend on domestic inequality
(), nor on the technology of redistribution (). This is just a consequence of the way in which
I have modeled the technology of repression: an increase in  increases repression in such a
way, that it maps into an equal increase in the cost and benet of revolution. While domestic
inequality is normally an important determinant of regime change in the literature, this simple
model allows me to better focus on the impact of foreign interventions. I will show later that
domestic inequality will still play a role in this model, by shaping the willingness of the incumbent
to unilaterally grant rents to F.
I now turn to analyzing F's intervention decision. For a given , F intervenes in H whenever
this is necessary and sucient to aect regime change to its advantage. In particular, if F is
against regime change, it only intervenes when the incumbent is too weak to resist on its own,
but would be willing to resist if F's intervention helped it to repress the challenger. If F is
in favor of regime change, it only intervenes when the challenger is not quite strong enough to
overthrow the incumbent, but would become so with F's external support. Dene:
m
F  r2(e)   r2(c) + [2(e)   2(c)]s   [ (e;R)    (c;R)]g: (17)
Then, it is easy to see using (7) that mF is a positive upper bound for mF when F is against
regime change, a negative lower bound when F is in favor of regime change. Intuitively, F is
in favor of the group that can be expected to concede more in terms of economic rents and
geopolitical alignment.
When mF > 0 (mF < 0) and mF  mF (mF  mF) is enough to prevent (trigger) regime
change, F intervenes; otherwise, it does not. To nd out when regime change actually happens,
16we then need to plug mF into (16):
 <  (1   )[2(e)   2(c)]s+
  [ (c;R)    (e;R)](1 + )g: (18)
The stronger-government eect (whatever appears in the rst line of 16) disappears in (18).
This is because the aggregate welfare gain (loss) that regime change aords to H is matched by
an identical loss (gain) to F. As foreign interventions internalize this, the stronger-government
eect - the force that pushes for the group with stronger bargaining power to assume oce in
H - is perfectly oset by the impact of foreign interventions. In other words, one reason why F
may want to intervene in H is to oppose the tendency of H's political system to select in power
the group that is less dependent on F. In this model, it is always just exactly able to do so.
In stark contrast, condition (18) suggests that the bilateral disruption eect is made stronger
by foreign interventions. Contrarily to the stronger-government eect, this eect is not associated
with a transfer of welfare from F to H, but rather with a joint welfare loss for the two countries.
As foreign interventions internalize F's share of this loss, the domestic political force that favors
the group with better bilateral relations is reinforced. Thus, a second reason why F may want
to intervene is to support the tendency of H's political system to minimize the risk of bilateral
disruption. Notice that there are two components to this reason for foreign interventions. First,
F worries about the economic consequences of a breakdown in economic cooperation. Second,
it worries about the consequences of this breakdown for H's geopolitical alignment. Crucially,
this second component decreases the probability of regime change if and only if the ongoing
geopolitical contest is of the Cold War type ( = 0). This is because it is only in this case that
bilateral disruption is associated with a joint loss of welfare.12
Before concluding this section, I re-write condition (18) as it applies in two special cases. The
rst is when bilateral disruption does not occur under either ruler ( (e;R) =  (c;R) = 0). The
second is when bilateral disruption does not occur if e stays in power, but it occurs if c goes to
12When  = 1, geopolitics enters the stronger-government eect, and is thus cancelled out as a result of foreign
interventions.
17power ( (e;R) = 0,  (c;R) = 1). The two special-case versions of (18) are:13
 < 0 (19)
 <  (1   )s   (1 + )g   : (20)
I notice that, in the rst case, the probability of regime change is the same ( 1
M) as if H and
F were not related (g = s = 0). On the contrary, in the second case the probability of regime
change is lower.
Period 2
In this period, Nature picks the stochastic component of the cost of revolution () from the
distribution U [ 1;M   1].
Period 1
In this period, the incumbent may choose to unilaterally concede rents to F's investors, and
to align itself with the government of this country. There is an obvious reason why the incumbent
may want to do so. Under some conditions, an appropriate mix of unilateral concessions may de-
termine the nal policy outcome to the incumbent's advantage. In particular, initial concessions
may create the expectation of a breakdown in bilateral cooperation following to regime change,
and in that case only. In turn, that would create a stake of F in protecting the current regime.
Comparing (19) and (20), we nd that this would increase e's chances of clinging on to power
by

M. Using the terminology developed in previous section, unilateral concessions may create a
bilateral disruption eect in favor of the incumbent. Notice however that this strategy can never
be successful if R = 1, since bilateral disruption is always ruled out under ecient renegotiation.
Thus, there will be no unilateral concessions if R = 1,14 and we only need to focus on the case
in which R = 0.
If R = 0, unilateral concessions always require 1 = 1 under current assumptions.15 But
13To avoid corner solutions, I assume that  < 1. Alternatively, I could have assumed  to be uniformly
distributed over the interval [ a;M   a], with a large enough and M > a.
14More precisely, it will be r1 = 0, while 1 will not be set.
15Whatever the total transfer unilaterally conceded by the incumbent, 1 = 1 is the strictly optimal choice if
 = 0. If  = 1, 1 = 1 follows from our assumption that all agents strictly prefer  to r as a tool to transfer
surplus (remember that these two tools are perfect substitutes when  = 1).
18under what conditions do unilateral concessions lead to a bilateral disruption eect in favor of
the incumbent? First, notice that there cannot be a bilateral disruption eect if r1 > max[re;rc]
(r1 < min[re;rc]), since disruption happens (does not happen) under both regimes in this case.
Next, if re < rc and e sets r1 2 [re;rc), there is a bilateral disruption eect that goes against the
incumbent, since disruption would only happen when e stays in power. Thus, the only situation
in which e may want to set r1 > 0 is for re > rc, or  > 
. If it does choose to set r1 > 0 in
this case, then its best option is clearly to set r1 = rc, since this is the least costly way to obtain
the desired bilateral disruption eect.
I thus need to derive conditions such that, if  > 
, e prefers to set r1 = rc to setting r1 = 0.
Dene e r  max(rc   re;0). Then, I show in Appendix A that the key condition for e to prefer
r1 = rc to r1 = 0 is:


































Condition (21) says that e concedes rents unilaterally whenever the benet from doing so is
larger than the cost. On the LHS of (21) is the extra probability of staying in power thanks to
foreign interventions, multiplied by the value of staying in power.16 The rst term of the RHS
is the probability that e remains in power, multiplied by the cost to e from setting r1 = rc if it
remains in power. Since the incumbent would have set r2 = re anyway, this cost disappear if
e r = 0. The second term is the probability that e loses power, multiplied by the cost of bilateral
disruption to e. To set r1 = rc creates the possibility of bilateral disruption between H and F if
c goes to power, and this is costly to e as well. The third term captures the lower cost of foreign
16The extra-probability of staying in power thanks to foreign interventions is less than

M, because the per-
spective of bilateral disruption following to regime change also prompts e to invest more in repression. Still, the
eect of foreign interventions is always to reduce the probability of regime change, as can be veried by plugging
in .
19rents when c goes to power. Finally, the last term captures extra costs of military expenses
incurred by e when r1 = rc.
An unambiguous prediction that comes out of (21) is that e is more likely to give out rents
strategically when, ceteris paribus, domestic inequality is high (high ).17 This is not surprising,
since in this case the benet of holding on to power is large relative to the cost of granting rents
to foreigners.
2.3 Results
I now summarize the characteristics of the equilibrium in form of propositions.18 To do that,
I introduce a last bit of notation: denote by FI(R) and RC(R) the probabilities that foreign
interventions and regime change take place in H, for a given renegotiation regime R.
I begin by describing H's domestic political equilibrium in a hypothetical world where H
and F are not linked by economic or geopolitical interests (g = s = 0). This case provides a
benchmark against which to compare the results in the general case.
Lemma 1 If H and F are not linked by economic or geopolitical interests (g = s = 0), the







for R 2 f0;1g.
Lemma 1 conveys two simple points. The rst is that government-to-government economic
and geopolitical cooperation provides the only rationale for F to intervene in H. Thus, there
are no foreign interventions when such cooperation has no intrinsic value (g = s = 0), and
H's political equilibrium is then fully independent on external factors. The second is that this
independent political equilibrium of H (as captured by the probability of regime change RC(R))
17This is easily veried by plugging  into (21).
18The proofs to all results in this section follow from our discussion in section 2.2, but are also reported in the
Appendix.
20does not depend on domestic inequality, nor on the technology of redistribution. As discussed
above, this is a consequence of assumptions made: a higher  has osetting eects on the
probability of regime change, because it increases the intensity of repression just as much as
it increases the prize from revolution. The reason for presenting such a stripped-down model
of regime change is that it allows us to focus more sharply on the consequences of foreign
interventions.
I now return to the case of interest, g > 0 or s > 0. The impact of foreign inuence on
regime change depends sharply on whether existing rents can be renegotiated eciently or not.
I thus look at two cases in two separate propositions. Proposition 1 looks at the case in which
renegotiation is ecient:
Proposition 1 If renegotiation is ecient (R = 1), the incumbent does not unilaterally concede
















Foreign interventions are against regime change if  > 
, in favor of regime change if  < 
.
In the negotiations in period 5, ruling group i concedes rents ri, and aligns itself with F.
There is always a positive probability of foreign interventions according to Proposition 1
(unless  = 
), and these interventions are in favor of the group with the strongest economic
ties (after redistribution) with F. Thus, F intervenes against regime change if it has the strongest
economic ties with the incumbent, in favor of regime change if it has the strongest economic ties
with the challenger.19 Foreign interventions are more likely, the stronger the economic ties
between the two countries (high g), the more dierent the ties of the two groups (high    
),
and the higher the revolutionary threat ( 1
M).
A key point to notice that, in this case, foreign interventions are only motivated by economic
dierences between the two groups. Thus, the assumption that e and c have equal geopolitical
19Notice that, since 
 is increasing in , foreign interventions are biased in favor of the smallest groups.
21preferences is sucient to rule out any special role of geopolitics when there is ecient rene-
gotiation. Intuitively, ecient renegotiation prevents the economic dierences between the two
groups from expanding to create a cleavage in their geopolitical preferences as well. As a result,
any unfavorable economic consequence of regime change (or the lack of) from F's perspective
does not also contaminate the geopolitical relations between the two countries, which remain
good independently on who is in power.
One striking result of Proposition 1 is that foreign interventions do not have an impact on
the probability of regime change, which remains the same as in the case g = s = 0. As explained
in section 2.2, this is because the eect of foreign interventions (to favor the group with stronger
economic ties with F) are perfectly oset by what I called a \stronger-government eect"(which
favors the group that has the strongest bargaining power vis- a-vis F). Intuitively, the possibility
of decreasing the country's dependence on F is recognized by the political system of H, which
regulates the incentives to rebel and repress in favor of the group with the strongest bargaining
power vis- a-vis F. While these two eects need not cancel each other in reality (they do so
here merely by my choice of functional forms), Proposition 1 suggests that one role of foreign
interventions is simply to contrast a tendency of political systems to create governments less
dependent in the international arena.20
Next, Proposition 2 looks at the case with inecient renegotiation:
Proposition 2 If renegotiation is inecient (R = 0), there are two distinct cases:
 If   
, or  > 
 and condition (21) does not hold, the equilibrium is the same as for
R = 1.
 If  > 
 and condition (21) holds, the incumbent unilaterally set rents at r1 = max(rc;re)
20Another result of Proposition 1 is that F does not have a strong preference between e and c when most of the
economic ties it has with H accrue to the government of this country, rather than to any of its groups. Suppose
for example that g is the value of bilateral cooperation in the extractive sector, and H's mineral resources are
owned by a kleptocratic state. A natural way to model this situation would be to assume  = 1 and  = 1,
since whoever controls power has also a full stake in the extractive sector. But Proposition (1) then suggests
that F does not intervene in H based on an intrinsic economic preference for either group (except for the fact
that F still favors the smallest group). This example suggests that foreign interventions in some kleptocratic,
resource-rich African states may be driven more by considerations of temporary political expedience than by the
economic reasons illustrated in this model.























In this case, foreign interventions are always against regime change. In the negotiations
in period 5, the survived incumbent conrms the rents conceded in period 1, while the
successful challenger fully expropriates them. Furthermore, the former group aligns itself
with F, while the latter aligns itself against F.
Inecient renegotiation may lead to a dierent political equilibrium in one specic case:
namely, when the incumbent has stronger economic ties with F than the challenger ( > 
),
inecient renegotiation may create an incumbent advantage. This is because, in this case, the
incumbent may use its superior commitment capacity to unilaterally set rents at a level that
pre-gures conictual renegotiation should the challenger go to power. Faced with a higher cost
of renegotiation, F is then willing to stand by the incumbent's side in a larger number of cases
(FI(0) > FI(1)). Importantly, this higher probability of foreign interventions now reduces the
probability of regime change. This is because of the \bilateral disruption eect" discussed in
section (2.2): regime change is now associated with a joint welfare loss for the two countries, and
this is fully recognized by H's political system through weaker incentives to rebel and stronger
incentives to repress.21 In some sense, it is as if the incumbent could \hide" some of the prize
from revolution by transferring it to F, that is beyond the shield of bilateral disruption. Of
course, this is a costly strategy for the incumbent, and so it is only undertaken when its benets
are large enough (which is the case when condition 21 holds).
The incumbent advantage is larger (and the probability of regime change lower), the larger
is the cost of bilateral disruption. This cost has two components. First, there is an economic
component, g: regime change leads to a collapse in economic cooperation, which entails a cost
21As noted in section 2.1.1, I am modeling a situation where only F has the capacity to aect the cost of
revolution in H, but not its geopolitical opponent. The result that RC(0) is decreasing in s when  = 0 would
need to be qualied if F's opponent had also the capacity to intervene, but would arguably go through as long
as this capacity is not too strong.
23to both H and F. Second, there is a geopolitical component, (1   )s. The importance of this
component depends on the nature of the geopolitical conict. If this is confrontational ( = 1),
this component washes away, and the incumbent advantage does not depend on H's strategic
importance. Intuitively, this is because a more salient geopolitical contest between H and F
also boosts the revolutionary incentives of the challenger, exactly osetting the eect of F's
higher willingness to intervene. On the contrary, if geopolitics is of the Cold War type ( = 0),
the incumbent advantage is stronger in strategically important countries. Intuitively, a higher
strategic importance of H does not strengthen the challenger's revolutionary incentives.
Thus, when renegotiation is inecient economic dierences between two groups can now
endogenously create two very dierent geopolitical proles for them, despite the fact that their
geopolitical preferences are assumed to be identical. In fact, whenever the incumbent uses rents
strategically, the geopolitical alliance between H and F survives until the incumbent remains in
power, collapses if the challenger goes to power.
These results may help understand the role played by a few inuential Western countries
(such as the US and some former European colonizers) in the political evolution of some devel-
oping countries in the 20th century. The earlier literature has pointed out that large domestic
inequality was a key determinant of popular rebellion against elite-dominated regimes, and thus
an important factor in the advent of democracy (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). My model
suggests that, when foreign interventions are taken into account, the source of elite wealth is
important as well. In particular, elite groups that received a large share of their income from
trade-related activities were disproportionally inclined to please important trade partners in the
West with economic and geopolitical concessions. This created the basis for a Western role in af-
fecting domestic political change. Thus, on one hand Western countries intervened in a number of
occasions to help struggling elite holding on to power, or re-conquering it from fragile adversaries.
On the other, economic nationalism and \anti-imperialism" became intimately intertwined with
the redistributive rationale for revolution, as captured by the model's \stronger-government ef-
fect".22
22Often, successful regime change was followed by an outburst of economic nationalism (e.g. Iran, 1951-1953;
Guatemala, 1951-1954; Cuba, 1959-1962; Chile, 1970-1973), leading to a rapid deterioration of economic relations
between these countries and the West.
24The West's diculty to come to terms with economic nationalism also provides one reason
why the Cold War mattered so much for the domestic political evolutions of some developing
countries. Perhaps more than any other global contest between great powers, the Cold War gave
countries across Latin America, Africa and South East Asia a high strategic importance. On
the surface, the West may have had more economic leverage over these countries, relative to
the USSR. However the nature of these economic ties was such to prospect economic disruption
between the West and these countries, had their traditional rulers been supplanted by some of
the new forces that were pressing for democratization. The prospect of economic disruption
weakened the West's economic advantage, and this contributed to strengthening its support for
the status quo. Thus, domestic political change became linked to the Cold War through Western
interventions.
In the next section, I investigate how my story ts the case of US interventions in Latin
America in 20th century. Before moving on, however, I note that my model is compatible with,
and may help interpret, several recent empirical results on foreign inuence. First, under all
political regimes except for the one with inecient renegotiation, the model predicts that r
decreases when s increases. This is in line with evidence that the allocation of US aid followed
security concerns more closely during the Cold War than after (Meernik, Krueger and Poe, 1998),
and that the US allocates more aid to a country when it becomes a member of the UN Security
Council (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006).23 Next, the model predicts that F's interventions are
always in favor of the group that will concede higher rents to this country. This is consistent
with the results of Easterly et Al. (2010), that nd that governments that were installed or
supported by the CIA in 1947-1989 were more likely to divert public expenditure in favor of
US products. In the model's interpretation, this was so because these government represented
groups with stronger economic ties with the US, and thus more responsive to its large economic
power. Finally, Besley and Persson (2011) nd that countries that became members of the UN
Security Council witnessed a higher level of domestic political violence during the Cold War, but
not in subsequent years. The authors speculate that this may have do to with increased military
23The end of the Cold War would be captured by a generalized decrease in s in all countries, while temporary
membership of the UN Security Council would be captured by a temporary increase in the s for the country
concerned.
25aid received by the governments of strategically important countries during the Cold War. This
is consistent with the nal scenario described by Proposition 2, in which F's support to repress
c is larger when s is large.
3 US inuence over Latin America
In early 20th century, the Latin American political systems were as far from being well-functioning
democracies as they had been throughout the 19th century.24 Power was normally in the hands
of a small group of people, which included the traditional landed and merchant elite and, in the
most advanced countries (such as Argentina and Chile) a new elite of industrialists and urban
professionals. Although representative institutions were in place in almost all countries, these
often excluded the vast majority of the population from political participation (for example,
through electoral rules that locked rural votes under the control of big landlords), and remained
under the close control of the army. The excluded majority remained predominantly rural (al-
though there were signicant urban labor forces, particularly in the most advanced countries),
engaged in subsistence farming or landless, and subject to all sort of restrictions that kept their
manpower under control of the elite.
By the 1940s, however, the elite seemed to be loosing ground to the excluded majority. Social
pressure had increased steadily since the 1890s, when the organization of labor had led to the
beginning of an era of strikes and demonstrations. From the 1920s onwards, a large number of
opposition parties were formed (see Angell, 1994), most of which were determined to conquer
power by means of free and fair election. While these parties were ideologically heterogeneous,
they shared the goal of implementing some domestic redistributive reforms, and, particularly in
countries were foreign investment was large, to adopt a more nationalistic stance towards foreign
investors. In the aftermath of WWII, radical opposition parties managed to win elections in
a number of Latin American countries.25 In the decade or so that followed, the pressure for
24The Latin American countries obtained their independence from Spain and Portugal in 1810-1827. After
several decades of civil wars, the Creole groups (descendants of European settlers) that had controlled the colonial
economies and had fought for independence managed to stabilize the situation, and to entrench themselves in
power.
25For example, this happened in Guatemala, 1945; Venezuela, 1944; Costa Rica, 1948; Bolivia, 1952.
26political change lead to a series of electoral reforms that drastically increased voter turnout (see
Hartlyn, 1994, pp. 130-131). This seemed to suggest that an era of democracy and social change
had come to Latin America.
These expectations went largely unfullled, however. Already in the 1950s, several of the
opposition's early successes were reversed by military interventions which restored the status
quo (e.g. Venezuela, 1948; Guatemala, 1954). This process accelerated sharply in the 1960s
and particularly in the 1970s, when an endless series of military coups systematically overthrew
many elected governments that represented a serious threat of social change. The reversion of
the pattern of democratization is particularly evident in the average Polity IV democracy score
for South America (Figure 1). It was only from the late 1970s that political systems began to
be opened up again, leading to substantial democratization by the mid 1990s.
Figure 1: CIA interventions and democracy in Latin America, 1945-1989
Sources: Polity IV (democracy), Easterly et Al. (2010)) (CIA interventions).
This pattern of political change and democratization in Latin America cannot be well under-
stood without considering the external role of the US government. Since the early 20th century,
this intervened in a large number of Latin American countries to aect domestic political evolu-
tions to its favor. Interventions ranged from direct military action (mostly in Central America,
and in the early decades of the century), to the strategic allocation of economic and military
27aid, and, after WWII, to covert CIA interventions (Easterly et Al., 2010). The goal of these
interventions was to support the political forces that were perceived to suit American interests
best.
But what were these interests, and how did US interventions aect political evolutions in
Latin America? In a rst phase - lasting until the late 1950s - the rationale for US interventions
was primarily to defend the position of US investments. US investments became an important
share of foreign investments in Latin America in the late 19th century, and rapidly displaced
European investments in 1914-1929. Following to a second period of rapid growth in the 1950s,
the stock of US Latin American FDIs reached US$ 8.8bn by 1960, or almost 40% of all US FDIs
outside North America.26 Elite-controlled governments were originally responsible for granting
very favorable terms to American investors, particularly in the growing natural resource sector.
Consistently with this initial position, the traditional forces in Latin American politics remained
sympathetic to American investors throughout the period, although some of them came to favor
mild forms of nationalization in the 1960s and 1970s. On the contrary, many centrist and
leftist parties campaigned on nationalistic platforms, and did actually implement more aggressive
nationalization policies in several situations when they got to power. Because of these dierent
attitudes, US interventions were mostly oriented towards supporting the incumbent elite. In a
number of occasions (the most famous of which was perhaps the 1954 coup in Guatemala), this
led the US to actively participate in the overthrowing of democratically elected governments.
This pattern of US interventions can be usefully seen through the lenses of Proposition 1
and 2. The large expansion of US Latin American investments in the 1910s and 1920s was
associated with a strong diplomatic activity of the US government, who sought to use economic
and military pressure to help its investors prevail over Europeans competitors.27 For most of
the 20th century, economic pressure was a powerful tool in the hands of the US government, as
26This share is much lower today (around 20%). Source: Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial
Edition on line.
27Ever since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the US had pledged to protect the Latin American countries from
the perspective of a new European colonization. In early 20th century, the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine established the US's right to intervene in those Central American countries where domestic political
evolutions put US investments at risk. In 1901-1929, various US presidents actively helped the expansion of US
investors, using a mixture of economic and military power. For its focus on economic expansion, this period of
US foreign policy came to be known as \Dollar Diplomacy".
28many Latin American countries were dependent on the US market for their trade and external
credit.28 In many Latin American countries, US economic pressure went down particularly well
with the ruling elite, who controlled much of the export assets or monopolized the sectors of
the economy that most relied on US trade and credit. According to Proposition 1 and 2, this
specic economic position of the elite can help explain the rapid expansion of US investments
in the rst half of the century, as well as the US's preference for the status quo and the rapid
rise of economic nationalism. Intuitively, strong external ties made the elite a weaker, and thus
preferred, negotiating partner for the US government (Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, part 1);
these same ties also put the elite in the position of unilaterally conceding rents to American
investors, and thus tying the US government to the defense of the status quo (Proposition 2,
part 2). In this interpretation, economic power and the existence of suitable local allies may
explain why what is often called the \imperialistic" period of US foreign policy (1900-1930), did
not result in direct political take-over.29
US interventions were also partly responsible for the reversal of the democratization process in
the 1960s and 1970s. In this second phase, US interventions were largely motivated by Cold War
calculations. In its early years, the Cold War had touched Latin America only marginally.30 With
the advent of Khrushchev to power (1958), however, a distinctively new phase started, one in
which \Eurasia was still the central stake but no longer the central front", as the Soviet leadership
had decided that \Containment was to be defeated by encirclement", (Brzezinski, 1992, p. 38).
In this crucial phase of the Cold War, which lasted until 1979,31 Latin American came to the
28By WWI, many Latin American economies were dependent on the US market for their export of tropical
agricultural and mineral commodities. Furthermore, the US was a key source of borrowing for many Latin
American governments. Although the Great Depression made the US less interventionist (at the same time as
it severed the trade and nancial links between the US and Latin America), a pro-active diplomatic activity
re-started in the 1950s, as most Latin American countries emerged from World War II as dependent on the US
economy as ever. For example, the average share of the US in total exports and imports in 1950-1954 was 61%
and 76% in Cuba, 66% and 45% in Ecuador, 26% and 56% in Venezuela, and 50% and 55% in Chile (Mitchell,
1998). Early industrializers such as Chile often relied on US trade credit to nance their imports of intermediate
and capital goods.
29The US did establish military control over a few Central American countries; such control was soon surren-
dered, however, in favor of formally independent, if carefully selected, local governments.
30This was because the key front was Europe, and the death of Stalin (1953) put the USSR on the defensive
for a few years (Brzezinski, 1992).
31In this year, the invasion of Afghanistan and political problems at home and in Eastern Europe began to
move the Soviet attention away from the encirclement strategy (Brzezinski, 1992, p. 38).
29forefront. To \encircle" the West, the USSR oered economic and diplomatic assistance to Latin
American governments who decided to reject American inuence and aligning themselves with
the Eastern block. Just how dangerous this could be for US geopolitical interests became soon
clear, as revolutionary Cuba's Soviet alliance (1961) lead to Soviet nuclear missiles being installed
at a short distance from US territory (see below for more details).
Throughout Latin America, the fear of a second Castro tilted US preferences even more in
favor of the status quo. This is because it was perceived that opposition parties would not
only pose a treat to American investments, but also to US national security. On the contrary,
traditional parties were seen as a stronghold against Communism. This stronger preference for
the status quo mapped into an increase in the frequency and scale of US interventions.32 This
pattern is illustrated in Figure 1. The gure plots Easterly et Al.'s (2010) broad measure of
covert CIA interventions. This is the number of American countries where, in a given year,
the CIA either installed or supported a government leader.33 The gure shows that covert US
interventions were drastically scaled up during the central phase of the Cold War, coinciding with
a large decline in the quality of democracy in Latin America (particularly South).34 Because
opposition parties were naturally positioned to gain power through free and fair election, the US
preference for the status quo resulted in a strong anti-democratic stance of the US in this period.
Although the US aversion for a few left-wing parties may well be explained with specic
geopolitical preferences of these parties for the USSR, geopolitical preferences are not an easy
explanation for the systematic aversion that the US displayed towards regime change in Latin
America. This is for three main reasons. First, while inuential, communist parties did not enjoy
large popular support in Latin America (see Angell, 1994). Second, alignment in the Cold War
did not carry direct material benets to Latin American countries (as would have, for example,
a conict between countries over land). Finally, the US was by far the most important trade
32Latin America's increased geopolitical importance also mapped into a sharp increase in US aid in the 1960s
(Kennedy's \Alliance for Progress"; see Taet, 2007, for a recent review). This is consistent with the model's
result that an increase in s leads to a lower r.
33A similar sharp increase in CIA interventions is evident if we use Easterly et Al. (2010) narrow measure of
covert CIA interventions; see Easterly et Al.'s (2010) for more details.
34While this result is consistent with Easterly et Al. (2008)'s general result that Cold War CIA interventions
were detrimental to democracy, it is also suggestive of the role of the Cold War in aecting the decision to
intervene.
30partner of all Latin America, and a key source of foreign credit and aid. If anything, it could
then be expected that any Latin American government - independently on who controlled it -
would have naturally aligned itself with the US.
Proposition 2 provides an alternative, economic interpretation of the impact of the Cold War
on US preferences. During long decades of elite rule, complacent governments throughout Latin
America had made a large number of concessions to US companies. Although these concessions
were in part a reection of US economic power over the region, they reected a structure of
local governments in which the ruling groups were disproportionally subject to US inuence. It
could then be expected that regime change would be associated with a downward revision of
concessions to American companies. In any single country, however, the nationalistic claims of
opposition parties were matched by the need for the US to preserve a reputation of intransigence
towards expropriation of its investment. 35 Taken together, these two elements implied that
economic cooperation between the US government and a nationalistic opposition was likely to be
dicult, if not impossible. But this contributed to making regime change a security hazard, since
it would reduce the economic leverage of the US while increasing the value of Soviet economic
assistance.
In the next three sections, I further substantiate my interpretation by looking at the specic
experience of three Latin American countries.
3.1 Cuba
Cuba obtained its independence after a bloody revolution against Spain (1895-1898), a war
between Spain and the US (1898), and a temporary American occupation of the island (1899-
1902).36 In 1902-1933, power was administered by a series of conservative and liberal governments
that, partly thanks to electoral frauds and violence, stayed in power mostly to their own self-
35While not always emphasized by the US Administration, this need was cherished by Congress, who even
passed legislation forcing the President to cut aid to countries who expropriated American companies (the famous
Hickenlooper Amendment of 1962). Vandevelde (1988) suggests that, because of dierent electoral incentives,
Congress may be particularly keen on imposing sanctions against expropriation of US investments, while the
President may be more concerned with the foreign policy consequences of sanctions.
36By 1895, American trade and investments in the island were already substantial. One interesting interpreta-
tion of US intervention (Smith, 1960) is that the US wanted to defend its economic position from the risk of a
popular take over in the island.
31interest (Thomas, 1971, Ch. 41-50). These governments were all very close to the Cuban business
elite, who thrived in an economy dominated by the export of sugar and tobacco, and by the inow
of American investments. When the last of these governments was deposed by a revolution in
1933, the sign that the working and radical middle classes were having enough of the current
situation was clearly laid for interested listeners (see Thomas, 1971, Ch. 51). However an old-
style Cuban ruler, Fulgencio Batista, was able to seize power, and a 25-year period of relative
stability returned to the island. Unsurprisingly, however, a new revolutionary wave came up in
the late 1950s, leading to the take over by Fidel Castro in 1959 and to the end of \Old Cuba".
The governments of Old Cuba were very generous business partners for US exporters and
investors. While this benevolent attitude was partly the result of direct business links between
inuential Cubans and American companies,37 US foreign economic policy had also a substantial
role in facilitating this expansion. The US was by far Cuba's most important trade partner,
absorbing around 75% of Cuban exports in 1910-1950 (Mitchell, 1998). In particular, most Cuban
sugar was sold in the US, a highly protected market where Cuba enjoyed a preferential tari
(later complemented with a quota). The preferential tari was the key subject of two important
trade treaties in 1902 and 1934, where the Cuban government granted generous preferential taris
and levels of domestic taxation on American products of all sorts. These treaties gave American
products a key competitive hedge over German and Japanese competitors in the 1920s and 1930s,
neutralizing these countries' apparent capacity to sell at lower prices (Smith, 1960, p. 44 and
159).38 The tari was also used as a way to secure a favorable treatment to American investors in
the island, as witnessed by the rapid expansion of American investments in 1902-195939 and by
the fact that, whenever the tari came under attack by US sugar producers, American investors
37For example, Santamarina (2000) provides an interesting account of how the Cuba Company, a consortium
of American investors that intended to develop the Cuban economy after 1898, initially constructed its empire.
This was done by allocating stakes in the company's local operations to a network of inuential Cubans, whol
helped the company obtain a highly preferential treatment from the Cuban government.
38So favorable was the 1934 treaty that is was dened \a step in the direction of a sound Colonial Policy" by
contemporary observers (Smith, 1960, p. 161).
39US investments in Cuba increased from US$ 0.2 bn in 1913 to 1.5 bn in 1929 (Smith, 1960, p. 29), and to 2
bn in the 1959 (Sigmund, 1980, p. 43). American investors came to control, among other things, a third of the
island's sugar economy, all of the country's utilities, a major railroad system, the import, rening and distribution
of oil and the country's nickel reserves, most hotels and gambling, and various banks. In several instances, the US
government intervened directly with the Cuban government to obtain that foreign capital should not be admitted
in the island. See Thomas (1971, p. 510) for an example of such an intervention against the English.
32in Cuba stepped in to defend it as a way to defend their properties in the island (see for example
Smith, ch. 3, 4 and 10).
In sharp contrast with this benevolent government attitude, the forces that challenged the
status quo in Cuba from the 1920s onwards were mostly - if to a varying degree - nationalist and
anti-American. These forces were a series of parties founded in the 1920s to represent the Cuban
workers, students and other middle-class professional groups in the struggle against the Machado
government (1926-1933) and against foreign imperialism. While there was among these forces a
Communist Party with specic ideological adversity for the US (and with direct, although not
always strong, ties with Moscow), this group remained small and decreasingly inuential in the
run-up to the 1959 revolution. The root of nationalism and anti-Americanism in Cuba were
mostly political and economical, for it was realized how involved the US was in defending the
status quo in return for protable deals in the Cuban economy (Thomas, 1971, pp. 685-688).
Not surprisingly, American companies running essential local services (such as the utilities) were
seen with great hostility by a majority of the population (Bonsal, 1967, p. 265).
Faced with the threats of a change in regime, the US remained a constantly present political
force in Cuban politics, even after its ocial departure in 1902. When electoral frauds were
denounced in 1905 and the country seemed on the brink of revolution, US marines landed in
the island, re-installing American rule for the next three years. After Cuban rule was restored,
the US intervened in favor of the sitting government in 1912, 1917, 1919, as well as in various
other occasions during the 1920s. The US also played a key role in the revolution of 1933, where
its reluctance to recognize the government initially emerged from the revolution was sucient
to cause its downfall and the ascent of Batista (Thomas, 1971, p. 627).40 Finally, it provided
almost continued support to Batista in what Smith (1960) calls \The Twenty-Five Years Honey
Moon" between the US and Cuba (1934-1959). In all of these situations, US interventions
were primarily aimed at avoiding the type of regime change that would have led to an attack on
American privileges in the island.41 Although it was not always easy for the US administration to
40Thomas emphasis (pp. 627 and 688) the role that this particular US intervention had in fostering anti-
Americanism in later years.
41For example, talking about its attempts to avoid a revolution in 1906, the US Secretary for War declared that
\... the great trouble is that, unless we can secure peace, $M200 of US property will go up in smoke"(Thomas,
1971, p. 477). Such a strong US involvement in defending private investments is perhaps not surprising, given
33support violent and corrupt autocrats like Machado and Batista, ocials in the State Department
realized that someone like Batista \...saw it was hopeless for Cuba, whose life depended on a
restored sugar market with the US, to risk our disapproval." (Thomas, 1971, p. 688). Arguably,
the nationalists that the US government feared could take over in Cuba were less amenable to
this sort or arguments.
The model developed in section 2 suggests that when F's trade policy can be used to extract
large economic concessions from H, a ruling group with a relatively strong stake in trade will be
both very supported by the foreign country and very suboptimal a ruler for H. This may well
describe the case of Old Cuba, a country that was dependent on US trade policy and that was
ruled by groups whose income was disproportionally dependent on economic ties with the US. In
this interpretation, the rapid expansion of US trade and investments in Old Cuba can be partly
explained as a result of the country's economic position and political structure, as can the pattern
of domestic nationalism and US interventions. Clearly, domestic models of regime change would
have a hard time in explaining political evolutions in such a country: on one hand, they would
not consider the role of Cuba's main trade partner as an external protector of the status quo. On
the other, they would not see the role of nationalism to inspire the domestic political struggle,
or the \stronger-government eect" highlighted by my model. But the historical evidence seems
to suggest that these two eects did matter a lot.
The model also suggests that, when negotiations are history dependent - perhaps because F
cannot accept the reputation damage resulting from a downward re-negotiation of its existing
rents - regime change may be associated with inecient renegotiation, leading to a breakdown
in bilateral economic cooperation. This increases the cost of regime change to F, particularly
when there is a second policy dimension (geopolitics) in which H's alignment matters greatly to
F but relatively little to H. This prediction ts very well the evolution of US-Cuban relations
after the regime change of January 1st, 1959. By this time, the central front of the Cold War
had already began to shift from Eurasia to peripheral regions such as Latin America, as the new
Khrushchev leadership sought ways to encircle the West in its strongholds (Brzezinski, 1992, pp.
that personal business connections with Cuba were widespread within successive US administrations (see, for
example, Thomas, 1971, p. 686).
3438-40). In such a situation, geopolitical allies like Cuba had an enhanced strategic value for the
US. And the strong economic ties between the two countries (particularly relative to Cuba's weak
historical ties with the USSR) may have made it reasonable to expect a continued geopolitical
alliance under the new Cuban regime, particularly since Castro was neither a Communist not
otherwise strongly ideological.42
Soon, however, it appeared clear that expropriation of US investments would be the issue on
which bilateral relations would fall apart.43 On one hand, Castro's determination to free Cuba
from American inuence cemented his support by the 15-20% of unemployed, underemployed,
subsistence farmers, intellectuals and students from which he drew his strength (Bonsal, 1967, p.
266). On the other hand, US policy makers were compelled by the need to demonstrate rmness
against expropriation of US investments in a country that had often been seen as a showcase
for US-Latin America relations.44 Months of escalating tension led to successive crisis in 1960,
following which all American investments were expropriated, and the US imposed a full embargo
on trade with Cuba.45 Faced with the closure of the US market, Cuba asked and obtained the
commercial support of the Soviet Union. In return for economic assistance, Castro authorized the
installation of Soviet missiles bases in the island (1962). Although the missiles were eventually
withdrawn (1963), this was in return for implicit US acceptance of a Soviet stronghold in the
region (Bonsal, 1967, p. 3), a clear and painful exception to the Monroe Doctrine.
The case of Cuba illustrated to US policy makers the full extent of the risks associated with
regime change in Latin America. Throughout the hot decades of the Cold War (the 1960s and
1970s), the fear of a new Castro would deeply inuence the way in which the US government
chose to intervene in this region. I now consider the case of two countries where this choice went
in two very dierent directions.
42See, for example, the description of Castro made by Philip Bonsal, the last US ambassador to the island
(Bonsal, 1967). After meeting Castro in 1959, the CIA's chief expert on communism in Latin America declared:
\Castro is not only not a communist, is a strong anti-Communist ghter"(Thomas, 1971, p. 1211).
43Commenting on the outcome of the rst round of expropriation, Castro itself later declared: \the Amer-
ican reaction to the agrarian reform of May 1959 made me realize that there was no chance of reaching an
accommodation with the United States." (Bonsal, 1967, p. 268).
44The argument that the US attitude towards Cuba would shape reactions in the rest of Latin America was, for
example, important at the time of tari negotiations of the early 1930s (Smith, 1960, p. 68). In determining the
suspension of the sugar quota in 1960, the US government went against the advice on the American ambassador
in the island, who had warned about the possible geopolitical consequences of such a move.
45The sugar quota was suspended in July 1960, while the full embargo was imposed in February 1962.
353.2 Chile
Dierently from most other Latin American countries, Chile had a century-long history of con-
stitutional democracy at the onset of the Cold War.46 Nevertheless, power had generally been in
the hands of the Conservative and Liberal Parties, which represented the country's traditional
elite.47 Originally a landed elite active in the export of wheat, these had begun to invest in man-
ufacturing already at the beginning of the 20th century (Kirsch, 1977). With the onset of the
Great Depression, this process had been stimulated by the contraction of international commod-
ity markets and by the elite's capacity to secure protective policy by the Chilean government.
By the 1950s, Chile had become one of the few Latin American countries where manufacturing
was a truly important sector of the economy, and the traditional elite had managed to remain
in control of the process.
Despite the elite's continued grip on power, pressure from the left has steadily increased in the
rst half of the century. In the 1920s and 1930s, various opposition parties were formed, ranging
from the centrist Christian Democrats (1935) to the leftist Socialists (1932) and Communists
(1919). These parties would often form electoral and parliamentary coalitions in the following
decades, together with smaller opposition parties. While ideologically dierentiated, opposition
parties were all characterized by the desire to implement some social reforms, and by varying
degree of economic nationalism against the American investors that controlled the mineral sector
of the economy. Since the late 19th century, the Chilean economy had been dominated by the
production and export of minerals (rst nitrates, and then copper). After World War I, this had
come to be dominated by American investors,48 whose net investment position had increased to
US$ 540.2 million in 1950, or 11% of all US Latin American FDI (and approximately 4.5 % of
all US FDI).49 In 1950, copper export accounted for a vast majority of Chilean foreign exchange
earnings. Still, the widespread perception was that American investors and consumers retained
a large share of the value of the rent, through a favorable tax treatment and an agreed export
46With the exception of a turbulent period in 1924-1934, regular election had been held since the 1870s.
47A third, middle-class party (the Radical Party) formed two governments in the 1940s, without however
managing to reduce the elite's grip on power (Pike, 1963).
48Americans in the copper industry inherited the role that British investors in Chilean nitrates had played for
the fty years before WWI.
49See UN (1955) p. 159; and United States Historical Statistics, Millennial Edition On Line (Series Ee72-131).
36price that was often lower than international market prices.50
In the early 1950s, a series of electoral reforms succeeded in \unlocking" a large number of
rural votes that had until then been under the control of the landed elite. This increased voter's
turnout substantially (see Harlyn, 1994, p. 130-131) leading to the rst, serious electoral threat
to the established order: in 1958, Salvador Allende, leader of a coalition of leftist parties, got very
close to defeating the conservative candidate in the presidential election. As the leftist threat
presented itself again in 1964, the candidate of the centrist Christian Democratic party (Eduardo
Frei) succeeded in subtracting the presidency from the conservatives for the rst time. Having
run on a platform of moderate domestic reforms and nationalization (with compensation) of the
copper mines, the Christian Democrats did manage to redistribute some land and to establish
Chilean majority ownership over the copper industry. They fell, however, short of conquering the
\votes, hearts and minds of the poor" (Taet, 2007), particularly as their tenure was complicated
by a series of balance of payments crisis that required harsh stabilization measures. In 1970,
Allende was swept in power with a minority of votes, and began to govern with the external
support of fringes of the middle-class Radical Party and the Christian Democrats themselves.
In keeping with his electoral promises, Allende implemented radical redistributive reforms
and nationalized the American copper companies with very little compensation. In doing so,
he catered to the extreme nationalism of its direct leftist supporters. However he also enjoyed
the support of nationalists from centrist parties: in fact, Chilean nationalism was on the rise
in those years, partly due to dissatisfaction with Frei's mild nationalization program (Sigmund,
1980, pp. 145-147). As the US government reacted to nationalization by interrupting the supply
of credit and the US companies attempted to block the marketing channels for Chilean copper
(see Sigmund, 1980, Ch. 5), the economic situation deteriorated. Taking advantage of economic
distress, the military staged a bloody coup on September 1973, overthrowing Allende and inau-
50When copper concessions were initially granted to the American companies in the 1910s and 1920s, taxation
was so low that it represented the least important link between the industry and the rest of the country (Fortin,
1979, p. 185). Various attempts to reform the mining industry in 1940-1970 did manage to increase the Chilean
share of the rent, without however satisfying the nationalists. In the 1960s, the Chilean population was, together
with that of Ecuador and Peru (other major recipient of US mining FDI), among the most nationalist in Latin
America (Taet, 2007). Cockcroft argues that between 1910 and 1960, US copper investments in Chile generated
an estimated US$ 4 billion in remitted prots, out of an overall investments of about US$ 1 billion (Cockcroft,
1996, p. 537).
37gurating a 15-year period of military dictatorship. It was only at the end of the 1980s, and in
a country whose economy had been deeply modied by years of economic liberalizations, that
democracy was restored.
Throughout these political evolutions, the US government was active to prevent the ascent
or consolidation in power of the Chilean left. Traditionally, the US had stood on the side of
Chilean conservatives (e.g. Pike, 1963). As Latin America became a front of the Cold War in
the early 1960s, US aid to the Chilean government massively increased.51 Initially entrusted
with the ruling Conservative Party, this aid was later diverted to supporting the election of
Frei, who was seen as a more viable alternative to Allende (Taet, 2007, p. 76-77). Support to
the Christian Democrats was also provided through a series of covert CIA interventions in the
mid 1960s (Easterly et Al., 2010, p. 5). As Frei appeared unable to prevent the ascent of the
left, however, the US government shifted emphasis from aid to strengthening relations with the
military.52 This led to a decisive involvement of the CIA in the 1973 coup.53
The pattern of US interventions in Chile can, at least in part, be rationalized using the model
developed above. Particularly since WWII, the US government has a strong interest in Chilean
copper. On one hand, it closely cared about the value of American copper investments.54 On
the other, it wanted the price of Chilean copper to be kept low, particularly when conicts such
as the Korean or Vietnam war threatened to increase the price of this metal. In the early 1950s,
around 55% of Chilean exports went to the US, which was the source of 50% of Chilean imports
(UN, 1955, p. 159). Because of its strong market position as Chile's key buyer, the US was often
able to dictate terms to the Chilean government. For example, it used sanctions on Chilean
copper sales and the threat of an interruption in trade credits to obtain price rollbacks in at least
two occasions (1952 and 1965).55
51Kennedy's Alliance for Progress increased total US aid to Chile from $ 9.2 million in 1951-1960 to US$ 41.4
million in 1961-1962 only (Taet, 2007).
52This was also the reaction of a changed political mood in Washington in the late 1960s.
53See Church Report of the US Senate, Dec. 18 1975.
54For example, Dube et Al. (2011) nd indirect evidence that top US investors in Chile were involved in the
preparation of US military support to the 1973 coup.
55In June 1950 the US government and companies unilaterally decided to set the price of Chilean copper at
US$ 0.245 per pound, a price well below the London free market price. Strong public reaction in Chile induced
the Chilean government to rst negotiate with the US government an increase in the price to US$ 0.3 per pound
(1951) and then set up an independent marketing agency that purchased copper from the American companies
38The threat of US sanctions was eective at disciplining the Chilean government mostly be-
cause it hit at Chile's chronic balance of payments problems. Being dependent on copper and
US trade credit for its foreign exchange earnings, the Chilean economy deeply relied on smooth
relations with its main trade partner. This was particularly true given that Chile's manufactur-
ing sector, by then the leading sector in the economy depended on the imports of capital and
intermediate goods for its functioning. However the Chilean elite was likely to be particularly
vulnerable to a break up of this link. Industrialization in Chile had remained under the control
of the traditional elite (Kirsch, 1977, p. 106). These had used their inuence with the Chilean
government to obtain protection from the external competition, and to establish monopolistic or
oligopolistic positions in the domestic market (Ibid., Ch. 6). These positions were quite strong
in the 1950s and 1960s (Ibid, p. 107). To the extent that disruption in the national economy was
particularly harmful for the owners of these rents, it is perhaps not surprising that the Conserva-
tive and Liberal parties were the only two Chilean political forces not to be nationalist towards
foreign investors (Pike, 1963, p. 267). As suggested by Proposition 1, there were then two op-
posite forces through which the US mattered for Chilean politics. First, US external support
tended to be given to the traditional forces in Chilean society, thus making regime change more
dicult. Second, a nationalist sentiment made regime change more pressing, as it was estimated
that this would have improved the country's negotiating power vis- a-vis the US.
The model can also help interpret the intensication of US anti-leftist pressure in the 1960s
and 1970s, and its nal intervention to revert regime change in 1973. While the Chilean left could
well be seen as a threat for its relatively strong communist ideology, economic factors may explain
why the two parties were not able to overcome ideological dierences in the name of continued
economic cooperation.56 On one hand, the US economic position in Chile was incompatible with
at the agreed price, and re-sold it on the free market (1952). In reaction, the US orchestrated a boycott of
Chilean copper that involved some of its Western allies as well. As Chile struggled to sell its copper and stocks
accumulated, the government was forced to return control of marketing to the American companies, and passed
a new copper legislation that was very favorable to the companies (1955; see Fortin, 1979, p. 186-187). Similarly,
when the Chilean government unilaterally increased the price of copper from US$ 0.36 to US$ 038 in 1965, the US
obtained its rollback using a mixture of concessions and threat (see Hufbauer et Al., 1990, pp. 276-279; Taet,
2007, pp. 83-84).
56I do not intend to deny that the communist ideology of Allende and his closest supporters played an important
role in the deterioration of US-Chilean relationship. Instead, I start from the premise that ideological relations
may be partially shaped by economic relations, and investigate why the need for continued bilateral economic
39the aspirations of a majority of the Chilean population, let alone the minority leftist coalition who
took power in 1970.57 On the other hand, the US government was, at least in part, compelled not
to denote weakness against expropriation in Latin America, and particularly in a country that
had large US investments and was in a weak bargaining position. Shortly after Allende went to
power, mutual economic cooperation collapsed due to these two mutually irreconcilable positions.
But as in the case of Cuba, this implied that both the US lost its economic leverage to secure
Chile's geopolitical alliance, and economic diculties in Chile made this country a potentially
easy target for Soviet expansionist mires.58 As suggested by Proposition 2, these economic
factors provided an independent reason why Cold War considerations lead to a scaling up of US
external involvement (possibly, being decisive for Allende's downfall), on top of considerations
of ideological nature.
3.3 Venezuela
Venezuela was one of few Latin American countries59 where relatively sound democratic insti-
tutions, established in 1959, remained in place - with active US support - throughout the 1960s
and 1970s. The country's historical experience with democracy was mixed, however, and so was
the pattern of US external support for it. In the early decades of the century, the dictator Vi-
cente Gomez was able to retain power for an astonishing 27-years period (1908-1935). Although
Gomez's resilience was largely due to his capacity to cement support from key groups in society,
the display of US military support for the dictator also played a role.60
Key to US support for Gomez was oil. Historically dominated by the export of tropical
agricultural commodities (mostly coee, cacao and cattle), Venezuela began to exploit its vast
cooperation did not help to mitigate the ideological dierences between these two governments.
57This broad anti-American feeling was crucial for Allende to be able to pass its expropriation bills in 1971 (see
Sigmund, 1980).
58Cooperation between Chile and the USSR became increasingly important in 1970-1973, with the USSR
providing economic and technical assistance and Chile adopting a friendly foreign policy stance (see Sigmund,
1980; Evanson, 1985). The fact that Soviet assistance did not match in scale that provided to Cuba has been
explained with the Soviet skepticism that Allende would be strong enough to remain in power (Evanson, 1985).
59Together with Colombia and Costa Rica.
60The US Navy was frequently dispatched to the coast of Venezuela in the 1920s, in reaction to riots or rumors
of revolution. This display of external support contributed to making the 1920s a relatively peaceful period,
allowing the dictator to remain in power until his death in 1935.
40oil reserves in the early 20th century, as oil consumption in industrialized countries rst took o.
Initially, all oil concessions went to European oil companies. After WWI, however, US companies
began to penetrate the Venezuelan oil industry, getting to dominate it by the end of the 1920s.
While strong nancial capacities of US companies after WWI was an important determinant of
such success, the American expansion was also due to a clear preference for American investors
by the Gomez government. With the 1922 oil law - a piece of legislation that would shape the
industry for the next 50 years (Ewell, 1984, p. 57) - Gomez granted US companies terms that
were very low for international standards, and even low relative to competing oers (Rabe, 1982,
p. 35). In turn, Gomez's preference for American oil companies was intimately linked with
US diplomacy. Shortly after the end of the war, fears that domestic US supply would dry up
prompted the US government into an aggressive diplomatic oensive to help American companies
secure concessions abroad (Venn, 1986). In Venezuela, US diplomatic pressure went down well
with the Gomez government (Ewell, 1984, p. 58; Rabe, 1982). On the contrary, opposition to
the dictator became increasingly nationalistic in the 1920s and 1930s.
The cordial relation between Gomez and the US can be seen in the contest of the Venezuelan
economy and political system in early 20th century. A key source of support to Gomez came
from a small group of elite families, and from the army (Ewell, 1984, p. 50-53). The former,
an inuential group for most of the 20th century (Ewell, 1984, p. 51), based their wealth on
various activities centered around the thriving commercial sector of the coastal region. The
latter was lled by Gomez with ocers from his native Tachira, a relatively wealthy Andean
region whose economy was based on the production of coee for exports.61 By the second
decade of the 20th century, the US was already the largest trade partner of Venezuela, and this
pattern would considerably consolidate over the next decades.62 Gomez's generous concessions
to US oil investors - and the ensuing nationalistic vein of his opponents - may have been due
to economic pressure from the US, or from Gomez'a unilateral attempt to please an important
external supporter. For the two cases, Proposition 1 and 2 suggest that this pattern may have
61Gomez himself, together with his family, used his inuence to acquire an important stake in the coee, cacao
and cattle business (Ewell, 1984, p. 70.
62See Izard, 1970, pp. 185, 202 and 203. In 1912, the US was recipient of about 36% of Venezuelan exports,
followed by France (25%) and Germany (14%).
41been grounded in the strong economic ties that the US entertained with Gomez's supporters.63
In 1937, a group of left wingers who had rioted against Gomez in the 1920s founded a
party, Accion Democratica (AD), that would become the key player in the establishment and
consolidation of the Venezuelan democracy. AD had the goal to organize and represent the
peasants and workers, as well as the middle class groups that were being created by the oil-
driven development of the economy. Like many other Latin American leftist movements, it
stood for social reforms and a nationalistic approach to foreign investors. In 1945, AD had a
rst opportunity in power, after a revolution staged by junior military ocers and a subsequent
election won it the presidency. In the three years that followed (known as el trienio), AD extended
the franchise to universal surage and passed an agrarian reform. It also attacked the privileges
of the oil companies, by imposing an innovative 50-50 sharing rule for prots64, discontinuing the
system of concessions, and taxing the companies in kind. These radical reforms however alienated
AD the support of the military, and in 1948 a military coup replaced the AD government with
a military dictatorship that would last until 1958.65 Shortly after going to power, general Perez
Jimenez signed a revision of the 1939 commercial treaty with the US (1952).66 The new treaty
\gladdened the heart of the commercial sector" (Ewell, 1984, p. 109), and was shortly followed
by more concessions to US oil companies: in 1955, Perez Jimenez restored many of the privileges
of the oil companies. So happy were American investors that President Eisenhower decorated
Perez Jimenez with the Legion of Merit for his \contribution to the free enterprise system".
In 1958, however, a popular revolution in Caracas overthrew Perez Jimenez and elections were
held. Returned from a decade in exile, the leader of AD (Romulo Betancourt, or \the father of
the Venezuelan democracy") won by a large majority. This marked the beginning of a period
of constitutional rule that survived undisturbed through the Cold War. With governments in
1959-1964, 1964-1969 and 1974-1979, AD dominated the political life of this period. At the same
63That US trade power mattered for the treatment its oil companies received in Venezuela is consistent with
the fact that, as the Great Depression made the US more protectionist in the 1930s, the 1922 oil law came
increasingly under attack, leading to its revision in 1939. Signicantly, precisely around that time a new trade
treaty was signed between the US and Venezuela (Rabe, 1982, pp. 53-58).
64This sharing rule would soon become popular with oil-producing countries, and spread to other parts of the
world (most notably to the Middle East).
65Some analysts have claimed that the US government supported the 1948 coup (e.g. Cockcroft, 1996).
66By the late 1930s, oil had come to completely dominate Venezuelan exports. From this moment onwards,
trade treaties were mostly about negotiating the US tari on imported oil.
42time, power was surrendered to the centrist Christian Democratic Party in 1969-1974, marking
the rst democratic transition of power in the country's history. AD's rule in this period was
characterized by a steady increase in the pressure on the American oil companies, culminating in
their full nationalization (with little compensation) in 1974. Still, the AD governments enjoyed
strong support from the US government in the 1960s and 1970s.67
Why was the US able to come to terms with a nationalistic opposition in Venezuela, but not
in Chile? One possible explanation is that the opposition in Venezuela just happened to be more
ideologically close to the US than the opposition in Chile. In fact, although many AD members
and Betancourt himself came from Marxist origins, they later adopted a more centrist stance. In
the 1960s and 1970s, AD displayed a remarkable capacity to navigate between the right and the
left, implementing social reforms but at the same time systematically excluding the communists
from power. The AD governments also adopted a strongly pro-US foreign policy stance at all
times.
An alternative (or additional) explanation, however, is that economic conditions specic to
Venezuela put the Venezuelan government in the condition to renegotiate American oil rents
without triggering an automatic retaliation reaction from the US government. In fact, increasing
pressure on the US companies in the 1960s was not matched by signicant retaliatory measures;
and even in the face of full nationalization in 1974, US protests were very mild, and eventually
put on a side.68 In terms of the model, renegotiation of US rents was ecient in Venezuela. As
suggested by Proposition 1, Cold War motivations do not have a bite in this case, and alignment
to the foreign partner is guaranteed by the need for continued economic cooperation.
But why was renegotiation ecient in Venezuela? One possible interpretation is that this
was the result of both skillful maneuvering on the side of AD and contemporary international
evolutions in the oil industry. In the 1960s, the AD governments adopted a policy of strict
gradualism in revising the terms granted to the American oil companies. At the same time,
67For example, in the 1960s, Venezuela became the darling of Kennedy's Alliance for Progress (Taet, 2007).
68This was despite the fact that the level of compensation oered was very low (20% of actual investment, or
10% of its replacement value), and had been reject in a number of previous occasions by the US government
(Sigmund, 1980, p. 243). Mild US reactions can be explained with the fact that \...given the interest of the
companies in continuing to do business with Petroven and of the United States government in a continuing and
reliable source of oil, the general perception was that a stronger response was neither desirable nor necessary"
(Ibid., p. 244).
43however, they worked relentlessly at the creation (1961) and strengthening of OPEC, the organi-
zation of petroleum-exporting countries. The organization had the goal to increase the producer
countries' bargaining power vis- a-vis the international oil companies, and the governments of
consumer countries. Thus, as OPEC consolidated in the early 1970s, Venezuela could implement
its nationalizations at a time in which the US had to face a co-ordinated attack on Western oil
investments, and the room for sanctions against oil-expropriating governments had decreased
signicantly.69 Thus, political skills and international co-ordination may help understand AD's
capacity to conciliate the Venezuelan nationalism with US policy on expropriation. On one hand,
the gradual revision of terms in the 1960s was accompanied by a strong communication eort
by the AD governments, so that any progress made was carefully explained to the Venezuelan
public (Ewell, 1982). On the other hand, the consolidation of OPEC may have helped to mitigate
the reputational concern of the US government, thus making it more easy for it to accommo-
date to expropriation.70 Very dierent circumstances applied in the case of Chile, a country
that remained relatively isolated in its nationalistic endeavors.71 In this country, a cooperative
approach to nationalizations was bound to fail, as explained in the previous section.
69Until the 1950s, Western oil companies had remained able to defy expropriation in producer countries by
exploiting their control of processing channels, and by their capacity to increase production elsewhere. For
example, this was the response to nationalization in Mexico (1938) and Iran (1951-1953). A key achievement of
OPEC in the 1960s was to agree that, in case of sanctions against one of its members, the organization would
forbid the oil companies from increasing production elsewhere. This paved the way to the nationalizations of the
1970s (Venn, 2002).
70In Proposition 2, I have just assumed that F is unable to accept a downward revision of r. It is easy to
construct a multi-country reputation model (along the lines of Milgrom and Roberts, 1982, or Kreps and Wilson,
1982) where this assumption obtains from the reputational concerns of the government of F. In particular, suppose
that F holds rents in n small Hi, and may try to signal itself as \crazy" (a type of F that likes to retaliate against
expropriation, and that occurs with probability p) in its reaction to expropriation in Hj. The main insight from
this model is that, no matter how small is p, there always exist a pooling equilibrium in which both the normal
and the crazy type retaliate to expropriation in Hj (if n is large enough). However if it is extraordinarily costly
to retaliate against country j, there then also exists a pooling equilibrium in which neither type retaliates. There
are then two ways in which the creation of OPEC may have aected the reputational concerns of the US in
Venezuela. First, by helping to bring about simultaneous nationalization in many oil-producing countries, OPEC
reduced n (and thus the value of reputation); second, by increasing the cost of sanctions against its members,
OPEC created an equilibrium in which the US could aord not to retaliate in Venezuela, without damaging too
much its reputation.
71Dierently from oil, copper-producing countries had not created an international organization that could
soften the impact of sanctions against some of its members. Thus, a drop in import from Chile could be substituted
with imports from a variety of sources, both in developing countries (Peru, Zaire, Zambia) and in developed
countries (Canada, Australia, the US itself). More in general, copper was not as important a commodity as oil,
and was not so much the focus of public attention in the early 1970s.
444 Conclusions
I have constructed an economic theory of foreign interventions and regime change. This theory
considers a world where one foreign country has economic power vis- a-vis the domestic country,
but this power applies dierently to dierent groups in society depending on their involvement
in the international economy. In this environment, the rationale for foreign interventions is to
facilitate the rule of groups that are more dependent on foreign economic policy, since these
groups can be expected to concede more to foreign investors. However the eect of foreign
interventions is counterbalanced - in a very general political model - by the structure of incentives
towards regime change: these favor the groups that, being less dependent on foreign economic
policy, are better positioned to maximize national income. These results may help understand
the pattern of Western interventions in some developing countries in the 20th century, as well
as the role played by economic nationalism in fomenting the struggle for regime change in these
countries.
I have also allowed for a multi-dimensional foreign policy, and studied how regime change
plays out with the capacity of the foreign country to use its economic power to inuence the
home country's geopolitical alignment. My main result is that if existing concessions to foreign
investors can only be downsized at the cost of bilateral economic frictions (for example, because
of reputational concerns in the foreign country), each local group's geopolitical preferences may
emerge endogenously as a function of its involvement in the international economy. Thus, a
nationalist challenger may also be a less reliable geopolitical ally for the foreign country, since
foreign economic power is less eective a tool when this group is in power. I have used this logic
to explain the role of the Cold War in strengthening the West's preference for the status quo in
some parts of the world.
What do these result imply for the pattern of Western preference for democracy? On one
hand, the model is consistent with the fact that the end of the Cold War strengthened the
Western preference for democracy. On the other hand, the model suggests that we should
distinguish between (at least) two dierent types of transitions to democracy. The rst is one
that happens at the expense of an outward-oriented elite, perhaps used to making unilateral
45concessions to foreign investors as a way to entrench itself in power with foreign support. The
second is democratization at the expense of an autarchic elite, that prospers from controlling
protected segments of the national economy while a majority of the population would benet
from opening up to external exchange. In the model, the two cases would witness a very dierent
foreign attitude towards democracy: negative in the rst case, positive in the second. Whether or
not this example can be used to explain the dierent attitude of the West towards democracy in,
say, Latin America in the 1960s and Iran and North Korea nowadays, is, I believe, a fascinating
subject for future research.
In conclude by commenting on one possible extension. In the model, I have simply assumed
that there is one foreign country (F) with a superior capacity/willingness to intervene in the home
country (H). However my historical discussion has considered one notable example in which F
(the US) happened to be H's (Latin America's) main trading partner. More in general, it is
often the case that important trade partners are particularly inuential in the internal politics of
small countries. This link between trade patterns and foreign interventions could be investigated
in a richer model where multiple Fs had dierent trade ties with H, and with specic groups
in its society. The amount of external support that each group could expect to receive would
then depend on the group's relative ties with each of H's trade partners, and by the relative
importance of the various bilateral ties for H's total trade.
Appendices
A Derivation of condition (21)
Dene  as an indicator function that equals 1 if r1 = rc and zero if r1 = 0. From our discussion,
we know that if  = 1 it is  (e;1) = 2(c) = 0 and  (c;1) = 2(e) = 1, while if  = 0 it is
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c) + x]dx > 0:
Solving the integral and re-arranging gives condition (21).
B Proof of Lemma 1
By (8), (9) and (17), it is always mF = 0 in this case, from which it follows that FI(R) = 0.
Condition (16) also immediately reveals that RC(1) = 1
M.
C Proof of Proposition 1
From our discussion in section (2.2), we know that r2(i) = ri, 2(i) = 1 and  (i;1) = 0 8i in
this case. Plugging these policy outcomes in (17), we nd mF = re   rc =
 
(1 ), from which it




  . Plugging the policy outcomes in (18), we nd that RC(1) = 1
M.
47D Proof of Proposition 2
From our discussion in section (2.2), we know that r2(i) = ri, 2(i) = 1 and  (i;1) = 0 8i
when R = 0 but  < 
, or  > 
 but (21) does not hold. It then follows from the proof of
Proposition (1) that the equilibrium is the same as in that proposition. If R = 0,  > 
, and
(21) holds, our discussions suggests that it is r2(e) = max(re;rc), r2(c) = 0, 2(e) = 1, 2(c) = 0,
 (e;0) = 0 and  (c;0) = 1. Plugging this into (17), we may write:

FI(0) =







Using (8) and (13), it is clear that FI(0) is increasing in g and s. As for the equilibrium
value of RC(0), this follows straightforwardly from (20). 
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